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The ‘power of bond markets’ is a widely assumed and poorly understood feature of the global 
economy. We demonstrate that even in a bond market as stable as the United States this 
influence is considerable. In this article we scrutinize a particularly direct influence, the 
impact of U.S. Treasury yields on presidential approval rates. Our empirical analysis from 
1961-2010 demonstrates that rising/falling bond yields lead to a decline/increase in approval 
rates. We show that this impact is mediated via the U.S. mortgage market. The stronger the 
rise in mortgage rates, the stronger the influence of Treasury yields on presidential approval. 
We then outline the broader possible political impacts of this, particularly given foreign and 





The power of ‘bond market vigilantes’ to constrain government policy options has 
long been a central interest in a variety of academic literatures, and with good reason. 
The importance of US Treasury yields - the cost of borrowing the US government 
pays on its bonds - famously prompted campaign strategist James Carville to quip he 
wanted to be reincarnated as the bond market: as the bond market, ‘You can 
intimidate everybody’. Bond yields influence interest rates throughout the economy, 
determine the cost of government borrowing to fund public expenditure and thereby 
constrain policy choice (Mosley 2003; Rommerskirchen 2015). This political 
influence has long been the basis of the ‘power of the markets’.1 
 
Within political economy, the debate around the political impact of creditors, whether 
in the case of the United States or elsewhere, has thus far assumed an indirect impact 
on the democratic process itself. Two causal mechanisms dominate: either investors 
influence bond yields, which influence a government’s ability to balance taxation, 
spending and borrowing, which in turn influences the voting intentions of an 
electorate; or investors influence bond yields, which influence the overall 
performance of the economy, which in turn influences the voting intentions of an 
electorate. Studies of how economic conditions can impact on democratic politics are 
of course not rare. By one estimate there have been over 600 articles on economic 
voting (Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo 2017). The literature distinguishes between 
egocentric, self-interested voting, in which individuals approve of and back in 
elections those parties or leaders that are good for their pocket book, and socio-tropic 
voting, in which national economic conditions influence voters (see, for example, 
Kinder and Kieweit 1981, Clarke et al. 1992, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). 
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Kieweit and Lewis-Beck (2011) caution that sociotropic voting can include those 
motivated by altruism and the public interest and those using national economic 
conditions as a proxy for personal economic conditions. In addition, evaluations can 
be retrospective or prospective (Fiorina 1981). By far the majority of studies address 
valence considerations, that is assessments of the economic performance of political 
actors (see, for example, Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, Clarket et al 2009, Whiteley et al 
2013), but positional (Stokes 1963, Butler and Stokes 1969) and patrimonial or wealth 
explanations have also been shown to have independent effects (Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck et al. 2013).2  
 
Within the political economy literature, therefore, the causal mechanisms implied are 
consistent with both egocentric and sociotropic models of the influence of bond yields 
on politics, with causal chains that involve a range of intervening variables, most 
importantly regarding government policy options or preferences and voter 
circumstance.   
 
In this article we bring these literatures together to focus on a possible source of 
investor influence on politics. We ask whether government bond yields impact on 
citizens’ satisfaction with incumbents, by considering the link between US Treasury 
yields and presidential approval ratings. This offers more than a new economic 
variable to add to the existing literature on economic voting. It represents a substantial 
additional source of investor influence, but one in which the influence on voters is 
more direct and the ability of government to curtail that impact is more limited.  
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Presidential approval matters not only in itself, but because it affects electoral politics 
very broadly and can influence domestic (Cane-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Barnett and 
Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Greer 1996; Druckman and Jacobs 2015) and foreign policy 
(Ostrom and Job 1986; Levy 1989; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Andrade and Young 
1996). It influences performance in presidential (Newport and Carroll 2003), 
congressional, senatorial and gubernatorial contests (Kernell 1977; Abramowitz and 
Segal 1986; Hummel and Rothschild 2014), improves perceived legitimacy (Canes-
Wrone and De Marchi 2002) and can serve to shift the legislative attentions of 
Congress (Lovett et al. 2014). 
 
We are interested in the way that bond markets can influence presidential approval. In 
so doing, our work builds on and adds to the research on the relationship between 
politics and markets. A number of scholars have scrutinized how politics influence 
markets, be it stock markets (e.g. Roberts 1990; Herron et al. 1999; Jones and 
Banning 2009) or bond markets (e.g. Schultz and Weingast 2003; Saeigh 2005; 
Vaaler et al. 2005; Bialkowski 2008). We rather focus on the potential impact of 
markets on politics, which has been a prominent theme in international political 
economy going back (at least) to the work of Karl Polanyi (1957).3 Our work fits 
within a larger body of research related to the economic voting literature, which 
considers the impact of economic conditions on presidential approval (Norpoth 1984; 
Beck 1991; MacKuen et al. 1992, 1996; Clarke et al. 1994a, 1994b; Erikson et al. 
2000; Lewis Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Berelmann and Enkelmann 2014). The bulk 
of previous work has focused on the impact of unemployment and inflation, but we 
also see attention to other objective indicators such as the stock market (Fauvelle-
Aymar and Stegmaier 2013; Alter and Goodhart 2003, see also Sen and Donduran 
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2017 on the UK) or subjective perceptions of economic conditions (Burden and 
Mughan 2003; Lebo and Cassino 2007). There is not a consensus, however, on 
whether and why different economic predictors influence approval.   
 
Why might the bond market influence presidential approval rates? There are both 
sociotropic and egocentric routes to influence, each of which could explain our 
hypothesised causal explanation of the link between US Treasury yields and 
presidential approval. Lower bond yields could facilitate greater spending, which 
would influence sociotropic evaluations of economic performance. Our contention is 
that one way this influence occurs is via the mortgage market. The influence of bond 
yields on US mortgage rates is substantial, and house prices are in turn strongly 
influenced by the availability and cost of borrowing. A link between house prices and 
general economic activity relies on the impact of the ‘wealth effect’ of such price 
changes on consumption. The bulk of such a wealth effect is perceived to be slow, but 
is apparent nevertheless (Carroll et al. 2006). The direct egocentric motivation from 
the cost of borrowing to voters’ preference is therefore a more direct political 
influence. Here, the bond market matters because a substantial segment of the US 
population are homeowners, or aspire to be so. As of the second quarter of 2018, there 
were 80 million outstanding US mortgage loans totalling US$9 trillion (Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York 2018). That is a lot of voters owing a great deal of money 
and owning houses that form the bulk of their wealth. Housing could therefore have 
an impact on voting intentions either because of the value of housing or the cost of 
borrowing, in either retrospective or prospective voter assessments.4 Furthermore, the 
structure of US mortgages with their built-in link between bond yields and mortgage 
rates, is an international anomaly. In the majority of developed economies’ housing 
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markets, mortgagees are tied to short-term interest rates. For example, more than 90 
percent of the mortgages in Australia, Ireland, and Spain are variable-rate mortgages 
(Lea 2010, see also Mertens 2017). This means more power for the central bank in 
terms of traditional monetary policy, as a change in short-term interest rates by the 
central bank can shift mortgage payments and the initial cost of new home loans. In 
the United States, by contrast, the Federal Reserve (Fed) is left with less direct control 
over developments in the housing market through its control of short-term interest 
rates, but the additional measures of unconventional monetary policy have a greater 
relative impact. Such national variation in housing finance have political 
consequences (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009).  
 
The influence of foreign investors on the conditions in the US mortgage market have 
featured prominently in explanations for the housing price boom which preceded the 
bust that led to the 2008-09 financial crisis (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2009: 
Bernanke et al. 2011) and is connected to the ‘savings glut’ explanation of the 
financial crisis (Bernanke 2005). Much of this discussion has focused on the fall in 
US Treasury yields reducing interest rates across the economy, including in the 
mortgage market, but there has also been analysis of foreign purchases of Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBS), securitizations of residential mortgages (Bertaut et al. 
2011; see also Schwartz 2009). The direct domestic political consequences of these 
developments has however not been explored, with any impact implicitly studied via 
improved economic growth. Our analysis certainly does not preclude direct impact on 
presidential approval from foreign investment in securities related to mortgage 
finance, such as agency debt and MBS, or from Fed purchases as part of their crisis 
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response. Indeed, it suggests that this is highly likely, even if demonstrating it is 
outside the aim of this article.    
 
The article proceeds as follows. We discuss the structure of US bonds and lay out the 
transmission link between developments in treasury yields and the mortgage market. This 
forms the basis of our two research hypotheses; first, on the impact of bond yields on 
approval rates and second, on the role of mortgage rates in mediating this effect. Next, we 
describe our data and methodology. We then discuss findings and outline a battery of 
robustness tests. The article’s conclusion outlines implications of the main findings in terms 
of understanding the impact of markets on politics 
From bond yields to presidential approval 
 
The potentially broad impact of movements in bond yields is reflected in the former 
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s proclamation that if he could only view one bit of 
data to give him a sense of what was occurring in the US and global financial 
markets, it would be the yield on the 10-year US Treasury (Forbes 22.12.2014).5 
Given that bond yields are a key measurement of the state of the economy, they, like 
other indicators of economic health, are presumed to have a direct influence on 
presidential approval. Bond yields are indicative of the prosperity side of the ‘peace, 
prosperity and probity’ function (Ostrom and Smith 1992: 128) of presidential 
approval. All things being equal, and put (too) simply, stable low bond yields are 
associated with the kind of sunny economic climate that should bode well for 
presidential popularity. We argue here, however, that they exert an independent 
impact on presidential approval, distinct from economic growth, inflation, 
unemployment and financial market risk.  This is in line with both egocentric and 
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sociotropic models of voters’ behaviour as it can speak to people’s personal 
pocketbook gain and societal economic gains in economically favourable times. 
The mortgage market 
 
We hypothesise that government bond yields influence incumbent approval ratings in 
the United States via housing finance. This is because the cost of the standard fixed 
rate mortgage in the US is directly linked to government bond yields. As government 
bond yields rise or fall, mortgage providers constantly adjust the borrowing cost for 
the standard fixed rate mortgage they offer, maintaining a differential with the 
appropriate government bond yield. The lower (higher) the government bond yield, 
the lower (higher) the cost of new mortgages. This means a direct impact ‘in the 
pocket’ for any new borrowers. An unusual aspect of the US mortgage market makes 
government bond yields even more significant. The traditional American mortgage is 
a thirty-year, self-amortizing (paying off both principal and interest), fixed-rate loan 
with an unlimited right of the borrower to prepay (and hence to refinance) at any time. 
Although originally introduced as an emergency measure during the Great 
Depression, this type of mortgage has become mainstream and accounts for 95 
percent of mortgages in the United States (Zywicki 2013). The right to refinance 
mortgages (provided mortgagees find a lender), means that the benefit of lower 
government bond yields flows directly also to many existing borrowers, rather than 
being confined just to new borrowers or those from whom they buy houses. In 2016, 
refinancing represented 47 percent of single-family residential mortgage borrowing in 
the US (Freddie Mac 2018). The volume of refinancing of mortgages has been much 
more volatile, and directly influenced by government bond yields, than borrowing for 
initial home purchase.6 Furthermore, further borrowing against the rising value of 
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your house is especially significant in the US. Homeowners can ‘cash out’ the gains 
from rising house prices to finance increased consumption. Such activity peaked in 
Q2 2006 at US$84 billion (Freddie Mac 2015, 2). The pricing of such loans is also 
mainly linked directly to government bond yields.7 Voters will therefore gain 
financially from lower government bond yields. Indeed, government bond yields 
should have an impact on voters’ pockets that will likely be more widespread across 
the voter population than actual or threatened unemployment, and arguably more 
direct (thanks to the ‘money illusion’8) than inflation. In addition to these egocentric 
influences, we should also expect US Treasury yields to influence voters whose main 
motivation is their concern with the performance of the economy as a whole. 
 
Despite these possible routes to influence, to date no published academic study has 
explored the impact of bond market performance on presidential approval. We would 
expect to see that as bond yields decline, presidential approval increases. Conversely, 
we expect that as bond yields increase, so too will disapproval of the president. This 
effect, we argue, is transmitted via mortgage rates.  
 
 Hypothesis 1: A rise/fall in bond yields has a negative/positive impact on 
presidential approval rates. 
 
Our first hypothesis is that there is a link between bond yields and presidential 
approvals but, for the moment, we do not seek, in testing this hypothesis, to determine 
whether that is due to the sociotropic or egocentric evaluations of voters. Our second 
hypothesis clarifies the route by which bond yields influence presidential approval:   
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 Sub-hypothesis: The impact of bond yields on presidential approval rates is 




We empirically test whether, and if so to what extent US presidential approval rates 
respond to movement in bond yields. We estimate a model based on monthly time-
series data, 1960–2010, where presidential approval is a function of bond yields and a 
set of political and economic control variables. Our decision to use monthly data for a 
run of more than fifty years is in part due to the documented volatility in economic 
indicators as predictors of presidential approval over shorter periods (Berlemann and 
Enkelmann 2014). 
 
Throughout we rely on a bespoke dataset composed of aggregate data from different sources. 
The dependent variable is presidential approval (Approval) as measured by Gallup – the 
‘Dow Jones Index for Politics’ (Brehm 1993: 6). Approval rates are aggregated monthly 
values using the last survey of the month to generate the monthly approval rates. Our key 
independent variable (ΔYield) is the US Treasury 10-year bond yield. A sovereign bond yield 
measures the return on investment, expressed as a percentage, on a government’s debt 
obligations (bonds, notes and bills). The Treasury yield in question is then the interest rate on 
US government debt for 10 years in the secondary market. In line with our preceding 
discussion we expect this variable to be negative. We use the first difference (change) in bond 
yields, to correct for the fact that the Yield term is non-stationary (see Appendix Table A1).  
 
Housing market variable  
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As stated in our sub-hypothesis, we presume that a key channel through which bond 
yields impact on presidential approval is via the housing market. The active housing 
policies of past presidents illustrate the importance of this market segment. US 
presidents have sought ways to boost homeownership as a way to curry favour with 
their electorate, notably via the government sponsored entities Freddie Mac, Fannie 
Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Banks or subsidies such as the mortgage interest 
deduction tax benefit. The fixed-rate dominated US mortgage market is highly 
sensitive to fluctuations in 10-year bond yields. Our variable of choice to investigate 
this link is the 30-year, fixed-rate conventional mortgage rate (Mortgage). To address 
stationarity, we use the first difference. Between 1971 and 2010 mortgage rates 
ranged between 3.96 and 18.45 percent and monthly differences ranged from -2.07 
percentage points to + 2.24.  
Economic control variables 
 
We include five headline indicators to control for the domestic and international 
economic climate. These variables are not only necessary due to their presumed 
explanatory force on presidential approval, but because they also are related to 
government bond yields. Controlling for these thus allows us to isolate the source of 
influence of sovereign bond yields on presidential approval.  
1) First, ΔGDP measures the annual Gross Domestic Product growth rate. We expect 
GDP growth to be positively associated with support for the president. 
Controlling for GDP growth also accounts for the overall economic impact of 
rising or falling bond yields. Government bonds represent the benchmark interest 
rates for the whole economy, not only the housing market, setting a minimum 
level for all borrowing and thereby strongly influencing economic activity. For 
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incumbent governments, a healthy economy is a significant influence on the 
chances of re-election (Nickelsburg and Norpoth 2000; Mcavoy 2006). The 
importance of government bond market yields (as the benchmark for borrowing 
costs across an economy) makes those yields a central concern for 
macroeconomic analysis. 
2) The unemployment measure (Unemployment) consists of the monthly 
unemployment rate. When unemployment rises, approval of the president should 
decrease. Unemployment also influences sovereign bond yields (e.g. Goldberg 
and Leonard 2003). Yet the causal chain is not a simple one. The low 
unemployment of good economic conditions could reduce bond yields, because of 
the positive impact on the government budget, or more likely they could increase 
yields, as the potential pressure of low unemployment on wages raises inflation 
concerns to which the Fed might react with higher interest rates. Low bond yields 
may therefore have a positive impact on future economic activity and thus 
employment, but there is no unambiguous link between government bond yields 
and the current or future performance of the economy. 
3) Inflation is the monthly estimate of the inflation rate. We expect that an increase 
in inflation will lead to a decrease in presidential approval rates. What is more, we 
control for inflation to account for the relationship between bond yield 
movements and price levels. On the one hand, low inflation could result in falling 
bond yields. Most bonds are fixed in nominal terms (i.e. not adjusted for 
inflation). That means that inflation erodes the real value of sovereign bonds. 
Investors seek to minimize this loss of the real value of their assets (see Mosley 
2003; Tomz 2007) by demanding higher interest rates which push up bond yields. 
If inflation risk is however considered low or even negative, like in most post-
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crisis Western economies today, bond yields fall (ceteris paribus). On the other 
hand, the popularity of government bonds during any ‘flight to quality’, 
particularly in the US, could mean bond yields are a direct beneficiary of serious 
economic difficulties, possibly regardless of inflation.9  
4) Fourth, we include government expenditure as percentage of GDP (Expenditure). 
The impact of government spending on presidential approval is contested. In line 
with the political business cycle literature, Presidents are charged with 
manipulating fiscal and monetary tools to enhance approval ratings (Golden and 
Poterba 1980). Yet there is also evidence that this strategy can backfire, 
particularly if voters perceive spending to be wasteful or excessive (Pelzman 
1992). Controlling for public expenditure also accounts for the effect of bond 
yields on government’s room to move: higher (lower) borrowing costs constrain 
(facilitate) government spending in other areas, including spending with potential 
electoral benefit for incumbents (Mosley 2003). Debt servicing costs make a 
substantial dent in the Treasury’s coffers; in 2017 they totalled US$ 263 billion on 
the federal debt alone or 6.6 per cent of federal net outlays (Federal Research 
Bank of St Louis).  
5) We furthermore control for financial market risk aversion. We not only expect 
market risk to impact on presidential approval, but also control for the risk 
climate in the context of bond yields and mortgage rates. When risk is perceived 
to rise, investors tend to sell their risky assets (such as stocks) and buy safe assets 
(notably US Treasuries). Rising financial market risk increases demand for 
Treasuries and thereby pushes bond prices higher and yields lower. We use the 
change in Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield on 10-
Year Treasury Constant Maturity as our ΔRisk variable, a conventional proxy of 
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general market risk aversion (Codogno et al. 2003; Bernoth and Erdogan 2012). 
High market risk often spells economic instability which is unlikely to be 
welcomed by the electorate. We thus expect presidential approval to decline with 
rising financial market risk.  
Political control variables 
 
In addition to these five economic variables, we include political controls common in 
the literature on presidential approval rates.  
1) There is evidence that divided government has an impact on presidential 
approval. In line with work on blame attribution in coalition government (e.g. 
Powell and Whitten 1993), various studies have argued that divided government 
diminishes ‘clarity of responsibility’ and has a positive effect on presidential 
popularity (e.g. Nicholson et al. 2002; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmaier 2013). We 
include the variable Divided which is a dummy coded (1) if government is 
divided – the presidency and at least one chamber of Congress are controlled by 
different political parties – and (0) if unified.  
2) We furthermore control for the period of goodwill which presidents experience 
during their first months in office (Mueller 1970; Smyth and Dua 1989). The 
dummy variable Honeymoon equals (1) in the quarter when a new president is 
inaugurated.10  
3) The literature of presidential approval strongly demonstrates that significant 
political events have an immediate effect on presidential approval rates (e.g. 
Mueller 1973; Brody and Page 1975; Kernell 1978; Ostrom and Simon 1985; 
Brace and Hinckley 1991; Clark et al. 1994; Parker 1995; Norpoth 1996; 
Newman and Forcehimes 2010). 11 We include variables for the following events: 
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Vietnam War, Watergate, Gulf War, Iraq War, Iran-Contra and September 11 
(Vector E below).12  
4) We include a set of administration dummies as is customary in the literature. This 
controls for president-specific effects on popularity ratings. (Vector A).  
 
By including a range of different economic indicators, as well as variables covering 
events, wars and political variables we seek to avoid omitted variables bias. While a 
greater number of variables runs the risk of multicollinearity, and there are varying 
levels of correlation across the economic predicators, the tolerance statistic (Mean 




[Fig. 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 presents the US presidential approval time series together with the movement 
of 10-year bond yields. The dashed vertical lines mark administration changes. As we 
can see, approval fluctuates, at times dramatically. The highest presidential approval 
rates occurred during so called ‘rally around the flag’ events (Mueller 1970); the 
September 11 attacks (2001) and the First Gulf War (1991). The lowest approval 
rates, below 30%, resulted from the public’s response to the Watergate scandal (1974) 
and the financial crisis (2008). Nickelsburg and Norpoth (2000: 318) remark that 
there ‘are forces at work restoring the balance in approval rates. Sooner or later sky-
high rates return back to earth, and rock bottom rates bounce back up’. While a 
correction of these high-rise ratings often takes place during a given president’s term, 
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base ratings often only recover after the election of a new president. The ‘public hand’ 
(ibid.) in restoring equilibrium in presidential approval is undeniable.  
 
Summary statistics of all variables, data sources, and the expected signs of the 
independent variables are shown in Table 1.  We should note that unit root tests were 
performed to assess the stationarity of our variables. In those instances where 
variables are non-stationary we have used the first difference transformation. As a 
result, all the variables used in the model are stationary. 
 
[Table 1. about here] 
 
To assess the relationship between bond yields and presidential approval we have 
estimated the following model:  
 
 Approvalt = α + β1ΔYieldt + β2ΔRiskt + β5ΔGDPt+ β3Inflationt + 
β4Unemploymentt + β5ΔExpendituret + β6Dividedt + β6Honeymoont + 
β7Et + β8At + εt 
 
We are relying on monthly time-series data and it is therefore crucial to account for 
the potential of serially correlated errors. To deal with this issue some presidential 
approval studies estimate robust standard error OLS model with a lagged dependent 
variable (e.g. Kernell 1978; Ragsdale 1987; MacKuen et al. 1992; Nadeau et al. 
1999). There is reason to be cautious about the inclusion of lagged dependent 
variables as regressors (Newman and Forcehimes 2010). The use of partial adjustment 
models solves autocorrelation problems. Yet these models make specific implicit 
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assumptions on the lag structure of the effects of independent variables on presidential 
approval which are not necessarily uncontroversial (see Berlemann and Enkelmann 
2014). Beck (1991) objects that ‘[just] because the [partial adjustment] story has 
proven useful in economics it does not make it a natural story for political science’.14 
In order to avoid the specific assumptions of partial adjustment models, we estimated 
the model with Newey-West robust standard errors, which in a time series context are 
robust to both arbitrary autocorrelation (up to 12 lags were specified, as is 
recommended with monthly data)15 as well as arbitrary heteroscedasticity.16 We 
performed a battery of further checks, which are not presented here to conserve space, 
but which are available in the online Appendix. Specifically, we test for robustness of 
results regarding the impact of stock market movements, the maturity structure of 




The results in Table 2 provide support for our main hypothesis. The first column of 
Table 2 shows results with changes in bond yields as sole explanatory variable – a 
model with no explanatory power. The second column presents results with only the 
economic control variables included as regressors. The third column presents the main 
model specification and the forth column produces the main model without 
administrative dummies. As predicted, bond yields have a negative impact on 
presidential approval rates. According to our main model (last column of Table 2), a 1 
percentage point increase in bond yields would lead to a reduction in presidential 
approval rates of almost 5 percentage points, all other things being equal. This should 
be seen in the context of presidential approval generally being within a band of 30 – 
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80 percent over the period analysed (see Figure 1), and changes in US Treasury yields 
varying between -1.76 and +1.61 percentage points. 
[Table 2. about here] 
All five economic variables have the expected signs, although the coefficient of 
Inflation and ΔExpenditure are not statistically significant in all specifications. Of all 
economic controls our risk measure has the strongest coefficient. An increase in 
financial market risk aversion of 1 percentage point leads to a decline in presidential 
approval of almost 10 percentage points. The coefficient looks, at -9.78, impressive. It 
is however worth considering the distribution of this variable. Since we measure 
change in Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to the Yield on the 
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, the actual value of the variable does not 
fluctuate much, with the median value at .004. This means that most of the time the 
risk measure does not impact substantially on presidential approval. The average 
movement does not lead to even a half percentage point difference in approval rates. 
It is however in times of dramatic market up- or downswing that market risk can 
make a substantial difference. The heightened risk aversion amidst the uncertainty of 
the financial crisis in 2009, for instance, reduced approval rates by almost 10 
percentage points. On the flip-side, the sunny economic climate of the spring of 1980 
and its accompanying drop in market risk gave presidential approval rates a boost of 
the same magnitude. 
The impact of unemployment on presidential approval is also substantial. Comparing 
unemployment levels of 5 per cent to 9 per cent, our results translate into a reduction 
of presidential approval of -10 percentage point, ceteris paribus. GDP growth has a 
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positive albeit modest impact, with an increase of 1 percentage points for every 1 
percentage point growth. Our political controls have the expected signs and are 
largely significant in line with our expectations based on the existing literature. 
The effect of bond yields conditional on rises in mortgage rates 
 
To further investigate the link between the bond market and presidential approval, we 
include a measurement related to developments in the mortgage market. We 
hypothesised that the impact of bond yields is mediated via housing finance. 
Mortgage rates change when Treasury yields change. Our data confirm this 
relationship with the changes in the contract rate on a 30-year, fixed-rate conventional 
mortgage (Mortgage) being strongly correlated to movements in the ten year bond 
market (r(488)= .62). We also correlated the difference in ten-year bond yields with 
other housing market variables, namely house prices, homeownership rates and 
household debt and found no strong pattern of association. To further investigate this 
relationship, we include a mortgage rate measure (Mortgage), its squared term 
(Mortgage2) and its interaction with changes in 10-year bond yields 
(ΔYield*Mortgage) in our main model. The assumption behind this non-linear 
modelling is that the more mortgage rates increase, the more presidential approval 
rates will be negatively affected. Individual mortgage lenders will change their rates 
at different speeds in response to changes in bond yields, and individual mortgagees 
and prospective mortgagees will react at differing speeds to changes in mortgage 
rates, both in how quickly they might react to potential pocketbook gains, and in how 
quickly prospective gains or losses might have an impact on political outlook. While 
some delay is plausible, the precise lag period is not obvious. Any mortgage, with or 
without a house purchase, takes time to complete. Also, ‘repayment inertia’ is a 
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widely-noted phenomenon in US mortgage markets (e.g., Green and LaCour-Little 
1999), and low rates of financial literacy in the US (New York Times 20.07.2013), – 
as well as across OECD countries for that matter (Atkinson and Messy 2012) –, or a 
more charitable assumption of other life priorities, mean that individuals should not in 
general be expected to undertake the prospective evaluation of the impact of bond 
yields on mortgage rates. For these reasons we employ a variable with a one-month 
lag, which produces a negative coefficient. 17 Rising mortgage rates are therefore 
linked with decreasing rates of presidential approval. The joint significance of the two 
mortgage variables suggests that the more mortgage rates rise, the more negative the 
impact on presidential job approval rates. We then estimate the interaction effect with 
the one-month lag of Mortgage.  
 
[Table 3. about here] 
 
Results are presented in Table 3. Our main results still hold. This is also relevant as 
the inclusion of the housing market variables reduces the time span of our analysis 
due to data availability (1971-2010). The results of interaction models are not readily 
interpretable as regular additive models based on the coefficients presented in Table 
3. The variables Mortgage, Mortage2 and ΔYield*Mortgage are, jointly with ΔYield, 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level (Prob > F = 0.008).18 This does not tell 
us however whether the mortgage rate has an impact on the effect of bond yields on 
presidential approval at specific values or the size of this impact. Therefore, to be able 
to make better inference we calculate the full range of conditional coefficients and 
standard errors. These are graphically illustrated in Figure 2. The solid sloping lines 
indicate how the value of the estimated causal effect of Mortgage on ΔYield changes 
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across the range. These conditional coefficients are not statistically significant if the 
lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is below the zero line and the upper 
bound is above it. The coefficients are only significant when the upper and lower 
bounds are above or below the zero line. Turning to the visual results presented in 
Figure 2, we are able to see that the conditional coefficient on bond yields is negative 
across the full range of observed mortgage rate changes: an increase in bond yields 
reduces presidential approval rates. However, bond yields have no statistically 
significant effect on presidential support when mortgage rates are declining. This 
confirms our initial housing hypothesis; a rise in bond yields only has an impact on 
people’s approval of the president in office, if this rise translates into a rise in 
mortgage rates. This finding is consistent with insights from behavioural economics, 
particularly with the so-called ‘endowment effect’ (see Thaler 1980; Kahneman 
2003). Our sample is roughly divided in half with 212 months recording a decline and 
258 months recording a rise in mortgage rates. Once mortgage rates increase, a rise in 
bond yields increasingly leads to a decline in presidential approval rates, with the 
conditional coefficient ranging from just above -3.5 to -12. In other words, the higher 
the increase in mortgage rates, the stronger the bond yield effect felt in Pennsylvania 
Avenue. We know that foreign investors have been shown to reduce government bond 
yields (e.g., Warnock and Warnock 2009; Bernanke et al. 2011) but to increase 
volatility (Andritzky 2012). Our result suggests that there is no political gain from low 
rates if they translate into lower mortgage rates, but there is an observable cost from 
the increased volatility leading to increased yields and consequently higher mortgage 
rates. This questions the political advantage of involving and courting foreign 
investors in the sovereign bond market.  
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Bond markets affect presidential approval rates. A rise in US bond yields leads to a decline in 
approval rates. Our empirical analysis suggested that a key channel through which bond 
yields influence approval rates is the mortgage market, via changes in mortgage rates. Indeed, 
we find evidence that the larger the rise in mortgage rates, the stronger the impact of bond 
yields on presidential approval. This effect is independent of the impact of inflation, 
economic growth, unemployment, stock market movements, financial market risk or 
government expenditure. For those interested in the impact of economic conditions on public 
opinion, our findings are consistent with valence considerations of the economy. The change 
in mortgage rates could influence the pocket books of individuals or they could be seen as 
key measures of national economic health. Individual-level data would be required to tease 
apart these motivations. 
With respect to the impact of markets on politics, bond yields serve as more than yet 
another economic indicator, working in much the same ways as unemployment or 
inflation. By prompting variation in presidential approval bond market investors could 
exert stronger and more far-reaching influence than has typically been taken for 
granted. According to the ‘strong but narrow’ hypothesis of market discipline (Mosley 
2003), financial markets are said to care only about a handful of headline indicators 
when judging the credit risk of sovereigns in the developed world. As a result of this 
evaluation practice, governments are thought to retain considerable ‘room to move’ 
particularly in areas such as welfare state policies. Yet, the political consequences of 
presidential approval — from re-election, to legislation and foreign policy — mean 
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that the potential impact of bond market participants is larger than previously assumed 
and goes beyond forcing fiscal adjustment or pressing ‘market-friendly’ policies.  
 
A domestic debt crisis or default remains a distant possibility for the US, and when 
political disputes over the debt ceiling have appeared to threaten such an eventuality, 
the yields of US government debt have generally fallen. And yet government debt 
and, particularly foreign, bond investors’ evaluation of US creditworthiness continues 
to preoccupy policy-makers. Consider the testimony of Erskine Bowles (quoted in 
Krugman 2014: 470) co-chairman of President Obama’s debt commission, when US 
bond yields continued to plunge to historic lows: ‘But if our bankers over there in 
Asia begin to believe that we're not going to be solid on our debt, […] just stop and 
think for a minute what happens if they just stop buying our debt.’ This statement 
suggests that, even in a low-yield environment, so-called ‘bond market vigilantes’ can 
hold sway over public officials and constrain public expenditure.  
 
Discussion of market influence has focused especially on the potential power of 
foreign investors. In the case of the United States foreign investors own around half of 
the US Treasuries held by investors other than US government entities.19 Although 
not remarkable in international comparison (see Andritzky 2012), non-resident 
holdings of US government bonds have risen from only 2 percent in the mid-1970s. 
The US is noteworthy in the concentration of its foreign investment in a small group 
of central banks (Labonte and Nagel 2015), and some have concerns regarding the 
influence of China’s holding of US Treasury debt on US policy in the 2008-09 
financial crisis (Thompson 2010) and potentially in the current trade dispute (Merler 
2018). One analysis calculates that a reduction in foreign purchases of Treasuries of 
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$100 billion in a month would push US yields higher by 0.20 percent in the medium 
term (Beltran et al. 2012), another that foreign investment reduces yields by 0.80 
percent (Warnock and Warnock 2009). The likelihood of fears of investor exit being 
realised are considerably reduced in the case of the United States, it is argued, because 
of the attraction of US Treasuries as the world’s safest asset, and this attraction is a 
key underpinning of US monetary power (e.g., Andrews 2006; Cohen 2015). 
Furthermore, the implications for China itself of selling its Treasury holdings, in 
terms of losses and reduced exports to the United States if interest rates rose and the 
dollar fell, could make widespread sales unlikely, creating a stable ‘Bretton Woods II’ 
system of mutual benefit (Dooley et al. 2003). 
 
Debates around the potential influence of particular investors are of long standing, but 
have been given added importance in recent years by the fact that an investor with a 
particularly strong influence on government bond yields in a number of developed 
economies is now the central bank. An independent central bank has of course always 
had an impact on interest rates throughout the economy through monetary policy, but 
the aftermath of the financial crisis from 2008 has seen central banks drawn into much 
more direct interventions in longer-term debt markets, most obviously through 
Quantitative Easing, the creation of electronic money to buy securities (for details, see 
Schwartz 2016). Central bank activities may have an impact on inequality (Montecino 
and Epstein 2015) and sectoral advantage (Jacobs and King 2016), and central 
banking lacks democratic accountability (Engelen et al. 2011; Bowman et al. 2013; 
Ronkainen and Sorsa 2018).20 This direct link between Treasury yields and 
presidential approval, when the Federal Reserve owns over $2.3 trillion of 
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Treasuries21 (also Fisher 2014) and is considering how and when to shrink its balance 
sheet, adds importantly to this debate. 
 
This is not to suggest that bond yields rise because investors want to hurt presidential 
approval or drive up mortgage rates. As Rommerskirchen puts it (2015: 774): ‘Market 
punishment is hardly the result of a normative or pedagogical agenda of market 
participants, but instead, first and foremost, the result of any portfolio model with 
standard preferences for risk and return.’ That said, if Carville is right that bond 
markets can intimidate everybody, and the ‘everybody’ includes the US President via 
his or her approval rating, then those who take the decisions on buying and selling 
have a significant means of influence on US politics. This does not need to be 
confined to international investors or the Fed but could include very wealthy 
Americans or large domestic financial institutions (Hager 2014). This is also, it must 
be emphasized, a matter of reducing as much as increasing yields. Foreign investors 
reduce government borrowing costs, while also increasing volatility (Andritzky 
2012), and Fed actions after the financial crisis have been aimed directly at reducing 
yields (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011). Nevertheless, the link we have 
demonstrated between bond yields and presidential approval opens up new lines of 
inquiry. One area of further research, only touched on here, is comparisons across 
developed economies. The importance of the structure of mortgage financing is 
understudied in IPE and CPE, and offers a potential source of national variation in the 
influence of markets on politics (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009). 
 
There is evidence that voters reward and punish incumbents based on events the 
government has little or no control over, from shark attacks, to droughts, floods, and 
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the performance of local sports teams (Achen and Bartels 2002; Healy et al. 2010). 
Changes in bond yields are co-determined by events over which the US government 
has both considerable and little sway. It would therefore be wrong to consider the rise 
and fall in Treasury Yields as ‘financial market shark attacks’. Bond yields do 
respond to so-called domestic fundamentals like inflation or debt levels (Hilscher and 
Nosbusch 2010; Bauer and Rudebusch 2013, but see also Naqvi 2018). In addition, 
the strong link between mortgage rates and bond yields is the direct result of a 
deliberate housing policy which brought about the dominance of the 30-year fixed-
rate mortgage. A larger share of variable interest-rate mortgages, or mortgages with a 
shorter fixed-term would decouple mortgage rates from long-term bond yields and 
instead link mortgages to short-term interest rates, as in the majority of developed 
countries. This would reduce the influence of most bond investors, but central banks 
have more control over these short-term rates even in times of more conventional 
monetary policy. Governments, particularly in a country with considerable monetary 
power like the US (Cohen 2015, although see also Hardie and Maxfield 2016), are not 
at the mercy of fickle bond investors, but retain policy tools to shape and shield from 
the intimidation of the bond market. Many of these policy tools are however outside 
the direct control of the president, or, in certain circumstances, his or her party. The 
direct influence of government bond yields on presidential approval expands the 
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1 The market yields which determine the cost of government borrowing of course represent 
the aggregation of the actions of market actors in reacting to information; the degree to which 
yields rise or fall as a result of any president’s policies or changing macroeconomic 
conditions will be determined by buying and selling of US Treasuries that result. Although 
external events will have an impact on yields, therefore, this is only because of investor 
assessment of those events, and this assessment will vary by borrower (Mosley 2003), 
investor (Hardie 2012) or indeed over time. 
2 These patrimonial explanations are what Piketty (2018) has recently referred to as 
the Brahmin Left and Merchant Right, or, in one summary the ‘haves and have 
yachts’ (Kuper 2018) 
3 For recent research on the impact of market pressures on politics see inter alia Mosley 2003: 
esp. ch.5; Hardie 2012; Campello 2015. 
4 Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), in their review of the literature, conclude that evidence 
for retrospective pocket book voting is low, but that voters’ prospective views on their 
personal economic situation have a significant influence.   
5 Sovereign bond yields measure the interest payments that investors demand to lend money 
to governments. This domestic-sided description does not take into account external factors, 
notably international risk factors (so-called push factors). Our quantitative models account for 
global risk aversion. 
6 In one estimate, annual volumes varied from US$2532 million to US$234 billion for the 
period 2000-2016, compared to variation in borrowing for home purchase of US$1512 and 
US$505 billion (Mortgage Bankers Association 2015: 10). 
7 There are also ways in which higher government bond yields help individuals 
financially, but these are less prevalent. For example, pensioners can purchase a fixed 
rate annuity to give them a guaranteed (nominal) income. The income they receive 
will be higher if government bond yields are higher, as insurers use bond yields to 
price new annuities (similar to the pricing of mortgages, U.S. bond yields are used as 
a benchmark rate for the domestic annuity market). The U.S. annuity market, relative 
to the size of its economy, is small. ‘Given the choice, people do not choose to 
annuitize as expected to when attaining the end of their working lives’ (Rusconi 
2008). In 2005 the U.S. annuity market totaled US$ 15.8 billion – a far cry from the 
US$ 10 trillion mortgage industry (LIMRA 2005). Along similar lines, pension plans 
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rely on high bond yields to hit their target investment returns. The projections of 
future retirement income will likely to lower and the deficit on salary-linked pension 
schemes higher when bond yields are low. Persistently low bond yields therefore may 
put pensioner’s payouts at risk.  Although this poses a real threat to the sustainability 
of pension plans, its materialization is not likely to be captured in the time-frame of 
our analysis when most pensions have been considered relatively safe and the 
underfunding of existing schemes cannot be solely attributed to a low-yield 
environment.  
8 The widely accepted ‘money illusion’ suggests that individuals focus more on nominal than 
real monetary values (see, e.g. Shafir et al. 1997). 
9 Serious economic difficulties may well also result in falling inflation. 
10 The so-called ‘honeymoon effect’ is not a new phenomenon: Thomas Jefferson 
(1976) famously proclaimed that ‘I know well that no man will ever bring out of that 
office the reputation which carries him into it. The honey moon would be as short in 
that case as in any other, and its moments of ecstasy would be ransomed by years of 
torment and hatred’. 
11 A dummy variable controlling for the (failed) impeachment procedure against President 
Clinton in the aftermath of the Lewinsky affair fails to reach statistical significance (and is 
not retained in the final model). This confirms Zaller’s (1998) and Newman’s (2002) finding 
that although approval models show that the public punishes presidents for scandals, Clinton 
remained popular after several scandals, – indeed approval ratings actually increased during 
the Lewinsky investigation and impeachment proceedings. 
12 Following Norpoth (1984), we code the variable Vietnam as (-1) under Johnson and (+1) 
under Nixon (and (0) elsewhere). The effects of both Gulf Wars are measured by two 
dummies equal to (1) between August 1990 and January 1991 and between March and May 
of 2003. We also control for the patriotic revival after 9/11. The increase in presidential 
approval (from 55% in August 2001 to 89% in September 2001) is the most substantial boost 
yet recorded, overtaking FDR’s approval surge after Pearl Harbor. What is more this effect 
has been slower to decay than previous rallies (Gaines 2002; Hetherington and Nelson 2003). 
Therefore, instead of including a binary dummy variable, we create a variable that is zero in 
the quarters prior to September 11, and 1/i starting from that quarter (with i = 1, 2, 3, . . .). In 
addition, we control for the effects of two scandals involving the president. First, Watergate 
is a dummy taking the value (1) from July 1973 to August 1974, and (0) otherwise. Second, 
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Iran-Contra is a dummy equal to (1) between November 1986 and March 1987, and (0) 
otherwise. 
13 There is no agreement on whether economic determinants enter the popularity function 
contemporaneously or with a time-lag (t-…). We also ran our model with lagged economic 
controls (t-1). Results hold (see Online Appendix Figure A2). 
14 There is a wider debate as to the pros and cons of lagged dependent variables, which has 
been reviewed and analysed by Achen (2000, see also Beck 1991: 66). 
15 Using alternate lag values (either larger or smaller) had no effect on the overall results. 
16 We also correlated the difference in ten-year bond yields with other housing market 
variables, namely house prices, homeownership rates and household debt and found no strong 
pattern of association. 
17 We also ran our interaction model with lags of the change in bond yields (t-1, t-2, and t-3 
respectively), where the marginal effect was statistically not significant. This suggests that 
the impact of a change in bond yields on presidential approval is immediate.  
18 There seems to be however no simple correlation between presidential approval rates and 
the variables Mortgage, Mortage2 and ΔYield*Mortgage. 
19 Source: US Treasury 
20 In parallel, some interpretations of modern monetary theory (MMT) argue that 
governments borrowing in their own currency face no hard budget constraint, as they can 
always create money to repay their debts, and therefore budget deficits do not matter. MMT 
scholars have denied making such a claim (e.g., Black 2019). The increasingly vituperative 
debate around MMT has involved accusations that some leading economists have 
misunderstood the theory, and we would not claim the expertise to engage in it. However, 
any policy move influenced by MMT involving the greater integration of monetary and fiscal 
policy and control of government bond yields would, it is suggested here, have direct 
implications for presidential approval. An alternative outcome of such debates, simply a more 
relaxed view of fiscal deficits, would only make the political implications identified here 
more important.  
21 As of 15 August 2018. Source: FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
